Work From Home: COVID-19 vs. the Iran War
Google "work from home" search interest (0–100 normalized index) from January 2020 to May 2026. Two distinct economic shocks — one a health/mandate event, one a fuel price shock — produced the same behavioral signal through different mechanisms.
Overlaying both shocks on the same time axis — months since onset — reveals the difference in decay rate. The COVID shock (preference + mandate) produced a slow, sticky decay: elevated interest persisted for nearly two years. The Iran war shock (price effect only) shows a steeper initial decline, consistent with mean-reversion once the price stimulus moderates. Whether the Iran war leaves any permanent structural shift in WFH norms — as COVID did — will only be visible 12–18 months from now.
COVID-19 Shock (2020)
All-time peak. Driven by pandemic fear, preference shift, and government mandate simultaneously. Level 5 lockdown made WFH legally compulsory for most formal-sector workers.
Iran War Shock (2026)
62% of COVID's peak intensity. Driven purely by fuel price shock — no mandate, no health risk. Petrol up ~R6/litre; diesel up R7+/litre (net of levy cut). IEA recommended WFH as demand-reduction measure.
| Dimension | COVID-19 (2020) | Iran War (2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Primary mechanism | Preference shock + legal mandate | Price shock (fuel cost); voluntary |
| Search index peak | 100 / 100 | ~62 / 100 |
| Speed to peak | ~2 weeks (WHO decl. → peak) | ~2 weeks (strikes → peak) |
| SA oil price move | Fell −85% (demand destruction) | Rose +50% (supply shock) |
| SA petrol price change | Fell (demand collapse) | +R6/litre (net of R3 levy cut) |
| Decay rate (T+1) | Index: 75 (slow decay) | Index: 48 (faster decay) |
| Duration of elevated WFH | ~2 years (rotating restrictions) | TBD — declining as of May 2026 |
| Employer policy response | Forced migration to remote | Quiet reopening of hybrid options |
| Structural legacy | Permanent hybrid norm shift | Too early to assess |
| SA WFH ceiling (structural) | ~40% of formal workers; ~60% of employed workforce cannot WFH regardless of shock type | |
Sources: Google Trends; IEA 10 Point Plan to Cut Oil Demand (Apr 2026); Global Workplace Analytics; Statistics SA; Wikipedia, Economic impact of the 2026 Iran war. 2026 index values are estimates reconstructed from documented patterns. Built by timngalande.com.
The consideration index measures whether people are thinking about WFH. The commitment index — a composite of searches for external monitors, webcams, and ergonomic chairs — measures whether they are investing in it. During COVID, both rose sharply and the equipment spike lagged consideration by ~1 month (people searched "work from home" in March, then ordered monitors in April). During the Iran war, the consideration index spiked to 62, but the commitment index barely moved — because workers already own the equipment from 2020, and because most may regard this WFH moment as temporary.
| Metric | COVID-19 (2020) | Iran War (2026) | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consideration peak | 100 | ~62 | How many people thought about WFH |
| Commitment peak | 72 (Apr 2020) | ~28 (Mar 2026) | How many invested in equipment |
| Lag to equipment peak | ~1 month | Simultaneous / none | COVID: deliberate setup; Iran war: using existing kit |
| Incremental commitment ratio | 0.53 — high | 0.13 — low | Points of commitment per point of deliberation above baseline |
| Best explanation | Expected WFH to last; invested accordingly | Equipment already owned (COVID legacy); shock expected to be temporary | Permanence expectation + COVID capital stock |
Commitment Index: composite of Google Trends search interest for "external monitor," "webcam," and "ergonomic chair" (simple average, normalized to 0–100 scale of the composite series). Values are estimates reconstructed from documented demand patterns; individual series verifiable at trends.google.com. Built by timngalande.com.